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World- Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson:
Minimum Contacts in a Modern World
World Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson considers the problem
of modifying in personam jurisdiction to comply with the changing nature
of the American economy. Several lower courts had adjusted the "mini-
mum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington to allow for
the differences in modern economic lifestyle, but a uniformity amongst the
various approaches was lacking. Rather than synthesize a contemporary
test for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction, the World- Wide Court
chose to place state sovereignty above modern commercial realities and
adhere to a more rigid application of the minimum contacts analysis. The
author takes issue with this lack of flexibility and questions the inequita-
ble results that will likely occur from an approach that separates the con-
sideration of fairness to the parties from the minimum contacts test. It is
also shown that due to this separation, fairness remains only an academic
discussion. Also, the author urges a reconsideration of the issue with a
presentation of solutions and examples of other more modern approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Matters relating to personal injury and those involving purely
economic loss have traditionally been thought to differ. But, this
does not seem to be the view of the United States Supreme Court,
at least in terms of the contacts necessary to confer state jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state defendant. In World-Wide Volkswagen
Corporation v. Woodson,1 the Supreme Court, on writ of certio-
rari to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2 reviewed the Oklahoma
court's decision upholding jurisdiction over World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corporation and co-defendant Seaway Volkswagen, Inc.
The suit was initially brought as the result of the alleged defec-
tive design and construction of an Audi automobile sold in New
York, which resulted in injury to the plaintiffs in Oklahoma. The
1. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
2. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978). The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma noted that the proper approach to test jurisdiction
was against both statutory and constitutional standards. Its analysis probably did
not discuss the former because the Oklahoma long arm statute has been inter-
preted as conferring jurisdiction to the limits of due process as permitted by the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Fields v. Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) (jurisdiction may be extended over
anyone within the commercial chain); Carmack v. Chemical New York Trust Co.,
536 P.2d 897, 899 (Okla. 1975) (although one may contract for choice of law, one
may not contract for choice of availability to the courts).
Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld Oklahoma jurisdiction on the
grounds that the defendants received substantial benefit from the
availability of free travel through Oklahoma and collateral benefit
from that part of the auto industry within the state.
3
Although several lower federal courts and state courts had con-
sidered the difference in minimum contacts required to assert ju-
risdiction in an action for personal injuries, as opposed to
economic injuries, 4 the question as presented in the World-Wide
case was essentially one of first impression to the Supreme
Court.5 The Court was apparently prepared to determine whether
or not due process required fewer contacts to confer state juris-
diction over an out-of-state defendant in an action involving per-
sonal injury, than those contacts necessary to obtain jurisdiction
in an action involving economic harm only. A synthesis was
sought, using the essence of doctrines from cases such as Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington6 and McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co. 7, to create an analytical tool that would bring the
principles of in personam jurisdiction current with changing legal
policy and economic society.
Although commentators had predicted 8 that the Court would
follow the rationale in McGee and expand jurisdiction in cases in-
volving tort action, they were shown to be in error. The Court
preferred the concepts of Hanson v. Denckla9 and held, as in eco-
nomic actions, observance of state sovereignty was so important
that a defendant must purposefully avail himself of a forum
state's benefit in order for jurisdiction to be asserted over him.
Foreseeability of consequences within a state or collateral benefit
would not be enough. The logic of the majority as compared to
the minority with respect to a modern economic society will be
examined.
3. 585 P.2d at 354.
4. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe set forth the doctrine of minimum
contacts. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
7. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). McGee more fully delineated what would serve to cre-
ate sufficient minimum contacts. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer
and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 861 (1978), wherein the author predicted the Court
would follow the more progressive decisions and expand jurisdiction in cases in-
volving personal injury. The cases considered were progressive in that they rec-
ognized the distinction in effect between economic and tort actions. See note 179
infra for examples of these decisions.
9. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
In response to medical advice, Harry Robinson and family pre-
pared to move to Arizona to improve Mr. Robinson's health. To
facilitate the move, the Robinsons purchased a new Audi automo-
bile from petitioner Seaway Volkswagen, Inc.' 0 in Massena, New
York, in 1976.
En route to Arizona the Robinsons passed through Oklahoma"
with Mrs. Robinson and the two children in the Audi and Mr.
Robinson driving a truck containing the family possessions. 12 The
Audi was subsequently struck in the rear by another car, causing
the gasoline tank to rupture resulting in a fire that severely
burned Mrs. Robinson and the children. Following the accident,
Mr. Robinson continued on to Arizona and was later joined by his
wife and children after a recouperative five month stay in the hos-
pital.
Soon after the accident, suit was filed in Oklahoma against the
auto's manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft;1 3
its importer, Volkswagen of America, Inc.;14 its regional distribu-
tor, petitioner World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation;' 5 and the re-
10. Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., [hereinafter Seaway] is a New York corporation
with its principle place of business in New York. Its business activities include
retail sale of Volkswagen and Audi automobiles, service, and sale of parts. No evi-
dence was introduced to show that Seaway does any business in Oklahoma, ships
or sells products to that state, or advertises in any media intended to reach
Oklahoma. 444 U.S. at 289.
11. The Robinsons travelled 1-44, which parallels Route 66, which counsel for
respondents argued would be one of the most logical routes of anyone traveling
from the east coast to Arizona; hence, passing through Oklahoma on such a trip is
practically inevitable. Respondent's Brief at 3, 7, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
12. The facts are a synthesis drawn from the official report, the Respondent's
Brief, and from Professor Woods in Woods, supra note 8, wherein the author
spoke to the Robinsons and their attorney, Jefferson G. Greer of Tulsa, Oklahoma.
13. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft [hereinafter Audi] is a German
corporation responsible for manufacturing the car involved. Audi did not join in
the petition for certiorari, but chose instead to defend its product in Oklahoma. It
is likely Audi realized that any attempt to contest jurisdiction would be fruitless
since the manufacturer could clearly foresee consequences in any state by export-
ing its product to the United States. It may be said Audi purposefully availed it-
self of the United States as a whole and the State of Oklahoma in particular, by
allowing its automobiles to be brought into the country.
14. Volkswagen of America, Inc., is responsible for the importation of the Audi
and for similar reasons also chose not to join in the petition for certiorari. See
note 13 supra.
15. World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation [hereinafter World-Wide] is a New
York corporation distributing Volkswagen and Audi products to Connecticut, New.
tail dealer, petitioner Seaway. Jurisdiction was asserted over the
nonresident defendants by employing the Oklahoma long arm
statute' 6 granting personal jurisdiction over a person "causing
tortious injury in [Oklahoma] by an act or omission outside [the]
state if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
[Oklahoma] .17
Audi and Volkswagen of America submitted to Oklahoma's ju-
risdiction, but World-Wide and Seaway contested the state's au-
thority and sought review by writ of prohibition to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.' 8 Defendants argued that they had neither inten-
tionally nor sufficiently connected themselves with Oklahoma
such that it would be fair to subject them to Oklahoma jurisdic-
tion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the writ, using the
following rationale:
In the case before us, the product being sold and distributed by the pe-
titioners is by its very design and purpose so mobile that petitioners can
foresee its possible use in Oklahoma. This is especially true of the distrib-
utor who has the exclusive right to distribute such automobile in New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut. The evidence presented below
demonstrated that goods sold and distributed by the petitioners were
used in the State of Oklahoma, and under the facts we believe it reason-
able to infer, given the retail value of the automobile, that the petitioners
derive substantial income from automobiles which from time to time are
used in the State of Oklahoma. This being the case, we hold that under
the facts presented, the trial court was justified in concluding that the pe-
titioners derive substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in this
State.1 9
World-Wide and Seaway then sought review in the United
States Supreme Court by contending that there were insufficient
contacts with Oklahoma to justify the assertion of jurisdiction un-
der International Shoe;20 hence, their right to due process, as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States
York, and New Jersey. Joining with Seaway, World-Wide sought review by peti-
tion for certiorari. 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
16. The Oklahoma long arm statute essentially provides for jurisdiction over
anyone causing consequences within the state including the transaction of busi-
ness, the commission of a tort, the ownership of an interest in real estate, and the
entry into a contract of insurance. See note 33 infra for provisions of the typical
long arm statute.
17. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a) (4) (West 1980).
18. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978).
19. Id. at 354.
20. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe no longer required physical pres-
ence within state boundaries for jurisdictional purposes. Only such "minimum
contacts" were required such that it would be fair and, therefore, not in violation
of due process to require a defendant's appearance in the forum state's courts.
See notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
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Constitution, had been violated. The Court granted certiorari 2' in
order to consider the constitutional question and to resolve a con-
flict in the method of application of the International Shoe doc-
trine by several state courts, 22 including the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma.
III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MINIMUM CONTACTS
No discussion of minimum contacts would be complete without
mention of the historic case of Pennoyer v. Neff. 23 Pennoyer lim-
ited state jurisdiction to physical presence within a state's bound-
aries as shown by four separate situations: first, if the defendant
was domiciled within the forum state;24 second, if the defendant
was served with process while physically present within the fo-
rum state;25 third, if the defendant had consented to jurisdiction
within the forum state;26 and fourth, if the defendant had prop-
21. 440 U.S. 907 (1979).
22. Inconsistencies among the states may be noted by comparing cases such
as Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624
(1972); Tilley v. Keller Truck and Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128
(1968); Pellegrini v. Sachs and Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974); and Oliver v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967), with the reasoning of
Oklahoma's highest court. In contradiction to the holding of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, these cases held that auto dealers outside the respective states
had not connected themselves in a sufficient manner with the forum state to allow
the assertion of jurisdiction.
23. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled in, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). Pennoyer held that state power to adjudicate claims and subject
persons to its authority only extended to a state's boundaries.
24. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). The case concerned a resident
who had left his home state of Wyoming to avoid suit by his creditors. The United
States Supreme Court held out-of-state service of process to be valid since the de-
fendant's domicile within Wyoming was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
25. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). Service on an
airplane flying over the forum state was held to be valid on the theory that the
defendant was essentially present within that state. This holding seems violative
of the principle enumerated in International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977), since the defendant did not have control nor intend to enter the state
by merely flying over it. It does not seem such procedure is in keeping with tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice as required by the cases. The im-
plication of Shaffer indicates this method of service is no longer valid.
26. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (when de-
fendant agreed in contract for sale of goods to appoint a third person to receive
process in New York, he consented to suit in that state); Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U.S.
352 (1927) (defendant who operates a motor vehicle within a state impliedly con-
sented to suit in that state for any tort that occurs due to operation of the vehicle).
These cases imply that where the defendant has recognized the state's author-
ity, by observing traffic laws or agreeing to service of process within the state, the
defendant may be deemed to be physically present, although not actually or con-
erty within the jurisdiction of the forum that was attached prior to
commencement of suit.27
As shown, Pennoyer equated jurisdiction of a sovereign state
with the state's territorial boundaries. 28 The only contict suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction at this time was an actual physical
connection or presence exhibited within the forum state. This
concept remained viable for many years.29
In 1945, the Supreme Court responded to the needs of a chang-
ing economy and formulated a new test. In the case of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,30 the Court invited the states to
exercise jurisdiction over any person who may somehow affect
the state, whether directly or indirectly.3 1 The only restriction
was that sudh an exercise of jurisdiction required that a defend-
tinuously within the state's boundaries. State statutes embodying these ideas of
"implied consent" have been upheld on this basis. For a discussion of the concept
of implied consent, see Hunvald & Zimering, Whatever Happened to Implied Con-
sent? A Sounding, 33 Mo. L. REv. 323 (1968).
27. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), overruled in, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977). Jurisdiction of this sort is commonly referred to as quasi in rem, and is
asserted in circumstances where property owned within the forum state is held to
be a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over the owner-defendant even though the liti-
gation neither concerns the property itself, as in an in rem action, nor is related to
the cause of action.
The vitality of this doctrine has been seriously questioned since Shaffer. It now
appears that quasi in rem jurisdiction can do nothing in personam jurisdiction
cannot do better. This is true since the Shaffer decision held that the same mini-
mum contacts necessary for in personam jurisdiction must also be shown in a
quasi in rem action.
This concept was recently addressed in the case of Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320
(1980). Rush was argued and decided with World-Wide, with the Court holding
that the fact that the out-of-state defendant's insurance company did business
within the forum state would be insufficient to gain jurisdiction over a defendant
who in no other way connected himself with that state.
28. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). At this time the Court could not con-
ceive how a state's power could constitutionally extend beyond its physical bound-
aries.
29. It was not until 67 years later, in 1945, that this concept was expressly over-
ruled in International Shoe, although, various decisions, such as Hess and Milli-
ken, had stretched the concept to include situations where the defendant could be
"deemed" present within the state. See notes 24 & 26 supra.
30. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The vast increase in interstate commerce and modern
methods of transportation caused the Court to reconsider interstate jurisdiction
such that defendants would not be able to hide behind the veil of state lines.
31. An indirect effect may exist where a corporation acts wholly outside the
state with the knowledge that a result in the forum state is likely to occur. Such a
case may involve the negligent manufacture of a product outside the state that
causes an injury within the state. See Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth,
417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969) (defendant's knowledge that its product would be used
as tour buses in Hawaii sufficiently connected defendant with Hawaii for purposes
of jurisdiction); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 III. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (installation of defective valves on water heaters shipped
into Illinois deemed sufficient contact; state lines were seen as unimportant in re-
lation to modern methods of doing business).
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ant have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such
that the maintenance of the suit would not offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice."32 Many of the states re-
sponded by enacting long arm statutes which extended
jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the due process clause of
the Constitution.33 Since due process was the test, it was not en-
tirely clear exactly what would constitute the necessary minimum
contacts to render an out-of-state defendant amenable to suit.34
Twelve years later, in McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.,35 the factors that might establish minimum contacts were
again explored. The defendant, a Texas corporation, assumed the
insurance obligation of the deceased's previous insurer and sent
the deceased, a California resident, a reinsurance offer which was
accepted. All premiums on the policy were mailed from Califor-
nia until the death of the policyholder. Alleging that the cause of
death was suicide, the defendant insurance company refused to
pay on the policy. In the ensuing lawsuit, the insurer contested
California's assertion of jurisdiction over it as a violation of due
process. There was no evidence to indicate that the defendant in-
surer had ever solicited any business in California or conducted
32. 326 U.S. at 316. The doctrine of "minimum contacts" was created to show
that physical contact, as previously required by Pennoyer, was no longer the test.
It must be demonstrated that the defendant has somehow minimally connected
himself with the forum state such that "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice" are not offended. In International Shoe, the Court held that the
defendants had connected themselves with the State of Washington by merely
employing salesmen there such that a suit could be maintained in Washington for
back unemployment taxes.
Left open was the question of whether a defendant may have sufficient contacts
with the forum state to subject it to the state's jurisdiction for a cause of action
having no relation to its activities within the state.
33. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a) (4) (West 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 1634-35 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (West 1977).
The language of the statutes is similar. The state may exercise jurisdiction over
any person, whether a resident or not, who submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the state courts for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:
1) transaction of any business within the state;
2) the commission of a tortious act within the state;
3) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated within
the state; and
4) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within the
state at the time of contracting.
34. "'Due process' is an illusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable,
and its content varies according to specific factual contexts." Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
35. 355 U.S. 200 (1957).
any business other than with the one policyholder.36
The Supreme Court held that California could assert jurisdic-
tion over the defendant insurer because the insurance contract
had "substantial connection" with the forum state. The Court
found that California had a manifest interest in providing redress
for its citizens when parties to contracts breach their obliga-
tions.37 The Court also noted that the California residents would
be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to go to a distant
forum to litigate claims which essentially centered in other
states. 38 In balancing the interests of the parties, the Court took
note of the fact that although the defendant corporation was obvi-
ously amenable to suit in its home state of Texas, the only contact
Texas had with the litigation was that the defendant was based
there.39
It became clear that to establish minimum contacts for jurisdic-
tional purposes, a defendant must have intentionally connected
himself with the state in such a way as to benefit from the con-
tact, either by receiving the protection of the laws of the state, or
by receiving a benefit in an economic sense.40
In the following year the Court decided Hanson v. Denckla.41
Hanson was the first post-International Shoe case to invalidate
asserted jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. In Hanson, the
assignees and the designated beneficiaries of a trust initiated in
Pennsylvania together with a Delaware bank, contested the valid-
ity of an assignment of benefits made after the settlor's move to
Florida.42 Plaintiffs sought to bring suit in Florida and defendants
36. Id. at 221-22. International Life contended that its right to due process had
been violated since it had not substantially connected itself with California having
made only one insurance contract there.
In response to this problem, several long arm statutes have specifically enumer-
ated the making of an insurance contract as a basis for asserting jurisdiction. See
note 33 supra.
37. 355 U.S. at 223.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 221. In McGee, the Court appeared more willing to examine relative
hardships and relative fairness in upholding or denying jurisdiction. The narrow
focus on defendant's state contacts was not evident at this time. Therefore, under
McGee, the requisite contacts to confer jurisdiction could vary depending on the
nature of the case and the correlative fairness to the parties. By relying more on
Hanson, the World-Wide Court will reject this flexibility.
40. Id. McGee represented the least amount of contacts required when the
subject of the litigation was the defendant's activities within the forum state.
Where the claim does not involve such activities themselves, significantly greater
contacts with the forum state have traditionally been required. Such contacts may
exist within a series of contacts within the state, substantial revenue derived from
activities within the state, or benefits derived from state law. See Perkins v. Ben-
guet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
41. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
42. Id.
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contested Florida's assertion of jurisdiction over them. The
United States Supreme Court held that the Delaware defendant
had not "purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State,"43 and therefore, Flor-
ida's assertion of jurisdiction would not be allowed. The Court,
possibly fearful of the way in which McGee would be applied by
the states, stressed the point that in Hanson, no attempt had been
made by the defendant bank to connect itself with the forum.4 4
McGee was distinguished by showing that the McGee defendant
had received premiums from California such that the defendant
should have foreseen the possibility of suit within that forum. 45
In Hanson, a reversal in the expansion of jurisdictional con-
cepts by means of liberal application of minimum contacts should
be noted. The Hanson Court almost entirely disregarded all as-
pects of the litigation itself with the exception of defendant's con-
tact with the forum state.46
The Supreme Court again addressed the problem of sufficiency
of contacts in Kulko v. California Superior Court.47 In that case,
it was held that a father who merely permitted his daughter to
move to California to live with her mother did not have sufficient
contacts to allow the assertion of jurisdiction by California over
him in a suit for increased child support.48 The Court asserted
that any benefit the father might derive from not having to pay
his daughter's expenses in his home was only incidental to her
move to California and, therefore, insufficient to establish the req-
uisite contacts.49 The Court noted that although the state had an
interest in protecting its citizens, that interest was adequately
protected by the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
of 1968.50 Therefore, unlike McGee, no real hardship would be
43. Id. at 253.
44. Id. at 251. It is possible the Court was fearful of the flexible approach initi-
ated by McGee being applied too broadly. See note 39 supra. McGee was likely
seen as too great an interference with the concept of a united federation of in-
dependent states, since in many more cases jurisdiction would be upheld rather
than denied. The Hanson decision would now require intent or purposeful con-
nection before the forum state could properly claim jurisdiction.
45. 355 U.S. at 220, 223.
46. 357 U.S. at 251-54.
47. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 94-95.
50. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§ 1650-1659 (West 1972 & West Supp. 1980). The Re-
vised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968 allows a resident
claiming child support from a nonresident to file a petition in California and have
placed on the plaintiff by denying jurisdiction over the defend-
ant.5
1
The cases dealt with by the Supreme Court thus far have been
associated only with economic loss. 5 2 Although several lower fed-
eral courts and several state courts have dealt with the question
of jurisdiction over foreign parties causing torts within the forum
state,5 3 the Supreme Court had not addressed the subject until
World- Wide .54
Most of these lower court decisions turned on whether a de-
fendant should have foreseen the suit arising in the forum state,55
with any element of surprise being contrary to "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." 56 Evident in the lower
court decisions was a concern not only for fairness to the defend-
ant, but also fairness to the plaintiff.5 7 Additionally, the most effi-
cient place to litigate a claim was often sought by the more
enlightened courts.5 8 These decisions reflect judicial awareness
of the fact that often the plaintiffs have been seriously injured,
its merits adjudicated in the state of the alleged obligor's residence, without either
party having to leave his or her own state.
51. 436 U.S. at 99. The Court may essentially have been employing a McGee-
type balancing test in comparing the relative hardships.
52. See notes 25, 26, 27 & 29 supra.
53. See, e.g., Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974)
(auto dealer should anticipate interstate travel of its product); Benn v. Linden
Crave Co., 326 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (need only show minimum contacts to
require Swedish crane manufacturer to defend its product wherever it causes in-
jury); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966)
(dismisses literal interpretation of Hanson's "purposefully availing" concept in
favor of considering fairness to both parties); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) (tortious injury to plaintiff's property suffi-
cient contact to deem defendant within state for purposes of jurisdiction).
54. Although a tort situation was addressed in Watson v. Employers Liab. As-
surance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), the case was more directly concerned with the
applicability of Louisiana's direct action statute to gain jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant by attacking the contractual obligation of his insurance corporation do-
ing business in Louisiana. The language employed by the Court in Watson would
tend to indicate support for the dissent in World- Wide. A similar case decided in
New York is Sieder v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 317, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966)
(jurisdiction over defendant in direct action against insurer upheld). This concept
has now been disapproved in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
55. See note 53 supra.
56. See note 32 supra.
57. See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. at 253, 413 P.2d
at 734.
58. Cf. Cross v. Del Webb's Hotels Int'l, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Tex. 1979)
(jurisdictional analysis should focus on due process as fairness to both parties
rather than if the nonresident defendant's activities fall within the technical mean-
ing of "doing business"); Leu v. Leu, 481 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (since fair-
ness is a relative term, the interest of both parties must be balanced in order to
promote fairness); Bach v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 521 (D. Ariz.
1979) (failure to consider relative economic status of both parties may effectively
deny plaintiff his right to adjudication of his dispute).
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not merely in their pocketbook, but also in their very health and
well-being.
The elusive nature of due process in asserting jurisdiction over
a nonresident left the states without a truly adaptive formula
which could meet the needs of a changing economic society.5 9
The situation compelled the Court to seize the opportunity to
adapt the concepts of due process and in personam jurisdiction to
fit modern societal requirements and to distinguish between the
amount of contacts necessary in cases involving economic loss
and those involving personal injury. The Justices were faced with
the problem of deciding whether to continue the previous trend of
past decisions in expanding the ability of the states to assert ju-
risdiction over nonresidents 6o or to reverse the trend and return
to a more restrictive view.61 The Court ultimately decided in
59. Many of the various formulae proposed by state courts became overly con-
cerned with concepts of "doing business" within the state or "purposefully avail-
ing" oneself of state law such that they were unable to keep up with the
evergrowing outreach of corporations in a mobile society. See, e.g., Good Hope In-
dus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1155, 389 N.E.2d 76 (1979) (typical
rigid application of the Hanson rationale allowed that inconvenience may exist
without rising to the level of unconstitutionality); Wendt v. County of Osceola,
Iowa, 289 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. 1979) (employed five-fold test wherein the court con-
sidered quantity of contacts, nature and quality of contacts, source and connection
of cause of action with the contacts, interests of forum state in providing forum,
and relative convenience of the parties); Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prod.,
Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963) (employs five-fold test of Wendt); Clem-
ent v. United Cerebral Palsy of Southeastern Wisc., Inc., 87 Wis. 2d 327, 274 N.W.2d
688 (1979) (although proposing a qualitative rather than rigid quantitative analy-
sis, the court fell into a traditional interpretation of the state's connection). n
60. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957), in
which the Court noted the relaxation of the due process clause as a guarantor
against inconvenient litigation. The Court attributed the relaxing trend to a funda-
mental change in the American economy. This change may be demonstrated by
the great distance products may travel and the modern ease of transportation al-
lowing defendants to defend in distant forums without serious inconvenience. For
a discussion of the application of due process in jurisdictional cases see note 63
infra.
61. In preferring the more restrictive view, the World-Wide Court relied upon
the case of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), where it was held:
Even if the defendants would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from be-
ing forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the fo-
rum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for the litigation,
the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism,
may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judg-
ment.
444 U.S. at 294. The Court apparently believed the guarantee of immunity from in-
convenient or distant litigation was wholly secondary to the territorial limitations
favor of the more restrictive view. 62
IV. THE RATIONALE OF THE MAJORITY
The World-Wide Court noted at the outset that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment 63 was the standard by which
the decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma must be re-
viewed.64 The Court also noted that the minimum contacts test,
enumerated in International Shoe,65 was the method by which to
determine if due process had been met.66 It was hoped that the
minimum contacts criterion would be adjusted to consider the
differing set of circumstances 67 that arise in a personal injury
case as compared with one concerned solely with economic inter-
ests. Although the opinion had an auspicious beginning by look-
ing toward McGee, the subsequent strong reliance on Hanson
would serve as the basis for the Court's decision not to adjust the
jurisdictional tests for circumstances peculiar to personal injury.
A. The Influence of the McGee Decision
In analyzing the appropriate use of minimum contacts, the
Court saw the purpose of the application of the test as having two
related but distinguishable functions. First, it was believed the
doctrine protected the defendant from the burdens of litigating in
on the power of the respective states. A return to the Pennoyer decision seemed
desired.
62. The vote was six to three with the majority comprised of an opinion by Mr.
Justice White in which Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Stewart,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. The minority was comprised of Mr. Justice
Brennan who filed a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall who also filed a dis-
senting opinion in which Mr. Justice Blackmun joined, and Mr. Justice Blackmun
who filed a dissent of his own.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Looking to the famous phrase, no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," the Court
has traditionally held it must be fair that jurisdiction be exercised over a defend-
ant. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Components of this
fairness have been shown to include that the defendant reasonably foresee suit
within the forum state (although the World-Wide Court will discount the impor-
tance of foreseeability), he has availed himself of the state such that it is fair that
the state has power to compel his appearance and bind him by its decision, and
that the possibility of unfair forum shopping by the plaintiff be carefully scruti-
nized. See generally Woods, supra note 8.
64. 444 U.S. at 287.
65. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
66. 444 U.S. at 291.
67. Since tort cases traditionally deal with injured property and, more impor-
tantly, injured persons, the plaintiff's case tends to be less mobile than that of the
defense. Witnesses, medical records, pertinent evidence, the hospitalized injured
parties, and situations in which the site of the injury or accident is crucial, all
make it difficult to transport a case to the defendant's distant home forum. Since
tort cases also often concern multiple defendants, expansion of jurisdiction could
allow for judicial efficiency by consolidating the action in one forum.
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a distant or inconvenient forum. Second, the doctrine acted to in-
sure that the states did not unreasonably reach beyond their ter-
ritorial boundaries imposed upon them by their status as co-equal
sovereigns in a federal system. 68
The World-Wide Court believed the burden of litigating in dis-
tant forums was embodied in the ideas of fairness or reasonable-
ness and noted the precepts of the International Shoe decision,
which forbade offending "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice" 69 and required a relationship between the forum
state and the defendant making it "reasonable ... to require [the
defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there."7 0
Although the court would later place little importance on them, it
reiterated the factors that the McGee Court had set out as rele-
vant in deciding a question of fairness.7 1 The McGee formula in-
cluded an examination of the state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute;7 2 the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effec-
tive relief;73 the interest of the interstate judicial system in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of the controversy; and the
national interest of promoting desirable social policies. 74
The World- Wide Court recognized that the McGee decision sig-
nified a relaxed application of the due process clause as a limit on
68. 444 U.S. at 294. It should be noted that the Court's concept of fairness only
considered fairness to the defendant.
69. 326 U.S. at 316.
70. Id. at 317.
71, 444 U.S. at 292. Although the Court gave lip service to the relevant factors
concerning fairness shown by McGee, the rigid test imposed by the World-Wide
decision has nearly removed all importance from their consideration. See note 110
infra.
72. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). This
point examines whether or not the state is more than just a forum, and also exam-
ines whether or not its law and authority is somehow affected such that it may
have an interest in the resolution of the dispute. Oklahoma can be seen to have
an interest in dangerous products that enter the state and cause injury to citizens
or visitors protected by Oklahoma law.
73. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). Whether or
not the plaintiff will be able to obtain adequate relief in another forum is also of
appropriate concern for the court. If no other adequate forum is available, the fair-
ness analysis should allow jurisdiction to stand in the forum state. Cf Hutson v.
Fehr Bros., Inc., 584 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978)
(tremendous expense or impracticability of trying lawsuit in distant forum may
force unfair settlement).
74. 444 U.S. at 292. This point concerns itself with general judicial economy
and the avoidance of a multiplicity of lawsuits throughout the states. There may
also be a national interest in seeing parties, wronged by defendant's dangerous
products, compensated such that the injured do not become public charges.
state jurisdiction. This relaxation was attributed to a "fundamen-
tal transformation in the American economy."7 5 Not only was the
McGee decision recognized for its realization of modern commer-
cial realities, the World-Wide Court went further to note the
greatly accelerated development since the McGee holding in 1957.
However, the Court's realization of a change in the economy was
limited to a donsideration of inconvenience to the defendant.7 6 In-
stead of considering that modern products, designed to travel
great distances, could cause substantial harm to distant plaintiffs
and, hence, requiring expanded jurisdictional allowances, the
Court merely noted that "modern transportation and communica-
tion have made it much less burdensome for a party ... to de-
fend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity." 77
The Court refused to create modern jurisdictional tests that
would allow distant plaintiffs injured by modern products to more
easily recover their damages. The only effect the Court perceived
McGee to have, therefore, was to require the defendant to travel a
little further now than he would have travelled in 1945 to 1957. It
would seem a proper analysis and application of the test in Mc-
Gee would require more than this.78 The reason the World-Wide
decision did not contain such a proper analysis of McGee was be-
cause the Court's final decision did not rest on McGee, but actu-
ally involved a more rigid application of the Hanson decision.
B. State Sovereignty and the Hanson Decision
The World-Wide Court stated that in spite of historical develop-
ments, as noted in McGee, state boundaries still remain relevant
for jurisdictional purposes.7 9 Although the framers of the Consti-
tution provided for a national common market or free trade unit,
state sovereignty still limits the power of state courts over citi-
zens of sister states. Although the Court did not desire to return
to the simple rigid standard of Pennoyer, it believed that the due
process requirements of fairness and orderly administration of
laws free from outside state interference would not allow any
75. 444 U.S. at 293. This fundamental transformation can be seen in the areas
of transportation, communication, distribution, and mass media. The country and
the world exhibit a relation and interdependence that was not the case in 1945.
76. See note 68 supra.
77. 444 U.S. at 293.
78. By examining the tests set up by McGee, it would appear that Oklahoma
has an interest in protecting its citizens from dangerous automobiles, that the
Robinsons may not be able to seek adequate redress in New York due to the im-
mobility of their case; and that judicial economy and general efficiency would be
promoted by consolidation of all defendants in one forum.
79. 444 U.S. at 293.
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other course but to uphold Hanson .80
Relying strongly on Hanson v. Denckla,81 the sovereignty issue
was placed above all. Quoting from Hanson, the Court reasoned
that no matter how convenient technology has made the defense
of a suit in a forum state; no matter how strong an interest the
forum state may have in adjudicating the dispute; no matter how
efficient the location of the forum state may be for the litigation;
the assertion of jurisdiction which infringes upon the sovereignty
of the defendant's home state can not be upheld.82 Therefore, fair-
ness to the defendant will logically become an issue only if the fo-
rum state does not exceed its sovereign authority.
Under this reasoning a forum state will apparently be able to
act within its sovereign authority only when a defendant has in-
vaded the forum state's sovereignty in such a sufficient manner
that the state may, in return, invade the sovereignty of the de-
fendant's home state in order to gain jurisdiction over him.83 In
order to invade the sovereignty of the forum state, a defendant
must knowingly avail himself of benefits accruing from his activi-
ties within that state.84
The World-Wide majority was unable to find any manner in
which the defendants had affiliated themselves with Oklahoma.8 5
80. Id. at 294. The Court construed due process fairness to require predictabil-
ity in the application of the law. Although procedural fairness may be promoted
by the majority's holding, the furtherance of the substantial right of plaintiffs to
seek adequate redress is seriously diminished. As shown in the Court's applica-
tion of Hanson, state sovereignty was deemed so important that no other decision
could be reached.
81. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Hanson disregards the notion that the forum state may
be the center of the controversy and looks only to the defendant's intent. See note
43 supra and accompanying text.
82. 444 U.S. at 293-94. Cf. Bean v. Winding River Camp Ground, 444 F. Supp.
141 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (fairness to defendant considered over sovereignty).
83. This is the doctrine of "minimum contacts" found in International Shoe.
84. The concept of purposefully availing oneself of the benefits and obligations
of a state before being amenable to suit there was shown in Hanson. But see
Cummins, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product
Liability Actions, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1028 (1965). The author contends that since a
suit in tort would be frivolous without damages, it is the injury within state bound-
aries and not the negligence aimed at the state from without that is the wrongful
element upon which the suit is based. The "purposefully availing" concept can
not be seriously applied to product liability cases due to the fortuitous route that
products travel in order to arrive at their destination. Therefore, the injury occur-
ring within the state should provide the invasion. The same thought is embodied
in Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963), and Phil-
lips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. at 257, 413 P.2d at 736.
85. 444 U.S. at 295.
It was noted that since the defendants did not benefit from any of
the privileges of Oklahoma law, the single occurrence of a tort
committed within the state would not suffice to confer jurisdic-
tion. The fact that the defendant's allegedly defective product
caused injury in Oklahoma was not seen as a sufficient invasion
of Oklahoma's sovereignty to allow invasion of the sovereignty of
the defendants' home state in order to gain jurisdiction.
C. Foreseeability as a Determinant Dismissed
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that due to the
auto's designed mobility, entry into Oklahoma was foreseeable
such nat the defendants should have been aware of a possible
suit in that state.86 Fearing the fatally broad application of a fore-
seeability criterion, the Court held this not to fulfill the sovereign
invasion requirement that would allow reciprocal invasion by the
forum state.87
The majority stressed that it was not foreseeability of a defend-
ant's product entering and causing harm in the forum state, but
that it was the "defendant's conduct and connection with the fo-
rum State by which the defendant should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." 88 Apparently seeing no distinction
between an action in tort and a purely economic action, the Court
cited Hanson and Kulko as denying the importance of foresee-
ability.89 Neither of these cases were personal injury actions9 O
86. As'pointed out in Justice Brennan's dissent, the value of an automobile is
based on mobility. By being used in the very manner intended, the car entered
the forum state where the accident occurred. Prior notice would seem to have
been available to defendants by their very knowledge of the auto industry. Indeed
the defendants carried insurance for just such occurrences and stood ready for
multistate litigation. Respondent's Brief at 18, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205
(D.N.J. 1974) (interstate travel of automobile is foreseeable to dealer); Doggett v.
Elec. Corp. of Am. Combustion Control Div., 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969) (those
who place dangerously defective goods in the flow of commerce should be re-
quired to defend them wherever they reasonably end up); Tyson v. Whitaker &
Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1, 6 n.1l (Me. 1979) (due to the unique mobility of the automo-
bile, as evidenced by implied consent statutes, the jurisdictional analysis should
be expanded). But see Kailieha v. Hayes, 56 Hawaii 306, 536 P.2d 568 (1975) (fore-
seeability has nothing to do with a product's mobility and cannot by itself, estab-
lish minimum contacts).
87. The Court felt that to allow foreseeability as the test would be to uphold
jurisdiction whenever it was reasonably possible that the product would enter a
distant state. It was believed this would expand jurisdiction too far. The Court de-
sired the test to be whether it was probable that the product would enter a state.
This probability could only be supplied under the idea in Hanson of purposeful or
intentional connection. A specific connection must be evident; a general connec-
tion or "one directed at the states as a whole" will not suffice. 444 U.S. at 296-97.
See note 128 infra.
88. 444 U.S. at 297.
89. Id. at 295-96.
90. The Court was bothered by the unilateral action of the Robinsons in pro-
798
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and both were decided on grounds other than the notion of fore-
seeability.91
Steering away from foreseeability, and looking more in the di-
rection of such concepts as intentional dealing and economic ben-
efit,92 the Court believed that the requirement of intentional and
purposeful connections would give predictability to the legal sys-
tem and allow potential defendants to structure their conduct to
avoid liability.93
The "purposefully availing" or derived benefit must be more
than just a collateral benefit derived from the activities of others
in the forum state. Substantial benefit must be shown before ju-
risdiction will be deemed proper.94 Thus, the Court believed that
World-Wide and Seaway derived no benefit from being part of a
national network of Volkswagen dealers and distributors, and the
Court saw no merit in the argument that the Robinsons'
purchased the Audi for their trip across country because they
were aware of the nationwide service program employed by Volk-
swagen.95 The Court also would not accept the contention that
the Robinsons' driving of the car into Oklahoma was within the
stream of commerce and, hence, within the reasonable expecta-
tions of World-Wide and Seaway.9 6 It was held that such unilat-
viding what the Court believed to be the only contact with the forum state. But
"trust funds, [as in Hanson], and children, [as in Kulko], are not inherently dan-
gerous instrumentalities" designed to travel long distances at high speeds. In
terms of what the respective defendants may reasonably expect, those cases are
markedly different. Woods, supra note 8, at 910 n.213.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., by its very name, indicated its expectation of far
reaching influence. Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (policy de-
noted by the term "World-Wide" anticipated loss anywhere).
91. It is quite likely that the Kulko decision rested on the availability of the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968. See note 50
supra.
92. See note 67 supra.
93. If the Robinsons had informed Seaway, from salesman to corporate presi-
dent, that they were planning to drive their new Audi to Arizona via Oklahoma, it
is highly doubtful Seaway would have refused to sell the car. A seller is usually
much more "interested in the consumption of his product, not where it is con-
sumed." Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. at 259, 413 P.2d at 737.
94. 444 U.S. at 298.
95. All automobile dealers derive substantial benefit from factory warranty
service, where they perform warranty work on cars from any state and are reim-
bursed by the manufacturer. It is logical to assume that Audis may be more mar-
ketable due to the factory warranty program honored nationwide, including in
Oklahoma.
96. It is not clear why there should be any distinction between entry into the
eral activity of the Robinsons could not establish the necessary
contacts with the forum state.9 7
The commercial reality the Court may have been concerned
with was embodied in the majority's fear of the possible para-
lyzing consequences of a single out-of-state tort.9 8 Failing to note
other possible safeguards,99 the decision pointed out that, with
foreseeability as the sole criterion, a tire dealer could be forced to
defend a suit arising from a defective tire in Pennsylvania when
the tire was sold in California and installed on a car with Penn-
sylvania license plates.lOO This famous and troublesome example,
set forth by Judge Sobeloff in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre
Mills, Inc. ,101 would probably not lead to the paralyzing economic
consequences predicted by the Court with the application of a
modern jurisdictional formula based upon foreseeability. 102 Fear-
stream of commerce by commercial distribution or by the consumer. This is espe-
cially so when an auto has a reasonably long and useful life, sometimes seeing
many owners. An auto with a possible life span of one hundred thousand miles
(notwithstanding collisons) is unlikely to remain within one state for its entire
existence. See Mann v. Frank Hrubetz and Co., Inc., 361 So.2d 1021 (Ala. 1978).
But see Kailieha v. Hayes, 56 Hawaii 306, 536 P.2d 568 (1975) (foreseeability has no
connection with a product's mobility).
97. See note 90 supra.
98. 444 U.S. at 296. But see Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). The court of appeals stated that
the "day is long past when the 'minimal contact' necessary to satisfy due process
is to be equated with traditional concept of doing business." The most logical and
convenient location for trial was urged. In this case the single tort within state
boundaries was sufficient to convince the court that jurisdiction should be upheld.
Although strongly argued in Respondent's Brief at 8, 15, and 23, World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), this point was glossed over by the
Supreme Court in the majority decision. Oddly enough, it was also ignored by the
minority.
99. Modern jurisdictional formulae could likely be created to take into account
even these most problematic cases. See note 103 infra.
100. 444 U.S. at 296.
101. 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). The case involved purse string damages
only, where the plaintiff sued for loss of profits due to defective products. Judge
Sobeloff formed his famous hypothetical concerning the tire dealer to illustrate
what he believed would be the consequence if jurisdiction were expanded. He
foresaw jurisdiction being upheld with the least amount of foreseeability present
and failed to consider other factors. This case is another example of the tendency
to confuse tort damages with damages sounding in contract.
102. By using a minimum contacts connection only as part of the analysis, the
fairness issue again becomes important. By using a method suggested by Profes-
sor Woods, it can be seen that the State of Pennsylvania has a legitimate public
interest in promoting safety on its highways. See Woods, supra note 8. The de-
fendant is on fair notice of the tire's destination, due to the out-of-state license
plates. The remaining question then is whether or not.it be fair to assert jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.
The size of the defendant's business may become important. Was the tire
purchased from a small service station or from a large corporation such as Sears
Roebuck and Co.? Does the dealer often engage in the sale of tires to out-of-state
cars, possibly engaging in sharp practices since the dealer-defendant may know
the chance of being haled into a foreign forum is unlikely? Who will defend the
[Vol. 8: 783, 1981] World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ing an overly broad application, the majority felt that to allow
foreseeability as the test for the assertion of jurisdiction would
essentially appoint every chattel as an agent to receive process, l0 3
a concept disapproved of in Shaffer v. HeitnerlO4 in 1977. Again
the majority failed to distinguish when the chattel is the subject
of the litigation and where the chattel provides contacts to a state
for purposes of other litigation. 0 5
The majority went on to say that a car, as a dangerous instru-
mentality, has no relevance in affecting jurisdictional require-
ments, but is only relevant in affecting substantive principles of
tort law such as strict liability.106 It is not clear how the policies
suit, the named defendant or his insurance company? It may not be fair to require
a defendant to travel over 3,000 miles to defend his product where he made no ag-
gressive attempt to connect himself with the forum. This problem cuts two ways,
as the plaintiff must also travel if jurisdiction is not upheld. A true fairness analy-
sis, aided by an examination of the nature and quality of defendant's contacts with
the forum state, should be able to balance these interests. Woods, supra note 8, at
906-07. See Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966).
The Arizona court held in Phillips that a fairness analysis should include, not
merely a bare application of the minimum contacts doctrine, but also must con-
sider the nature and size of the defendant's business, economic independence of
the plaintiff, and nature of the cause of action including applicable law and practi-
cal matters of trial.
103. 444 U.S. at 296.
104. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The Court held that the mere existence of property
within the forum state is not enough, without further minimum contacts, to confer
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. This would clearly be the requirement
of fairness where the subject of the litigation was not the chattel itself. Where the
chattel causes injury, the defendant is not receiving process for other wrongs at-
tributable to the defendant, but actually for the wrong inflicted by the product it-
self.
105. If the defendant's product is capable of inflicting as much or more injury
as an actual agent within the state, where is the defect in making the negligently
designed, injury causing product sufficient contact to at least support a further
fairness analysis in order to determine where suit should be held?
It would seem clear that in World-Wide, Oklahoma is the more efficient state for
the litigation with witness, medical experts, and creditors present. As previously
discussed, the state's interest seems clear. Defendants' inconvenience as bal-
anced against plaintiffs' are such that no real inconvenience is suffered by defend-
ants. If the entry by the Audi into Oklahoma had been at least a sufficient contact
to trigger this type of analysis, jurisdiction would likely have been deemed proper.
See note 30 supra.
By using this type of minimum contacts analysis, the single entry of an auto into
the forum state would clearly not provide the jurisdictional minimum for suits
other than those concerning the auto itself (i.e., shareholder's derivative actions or
contract actions). See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
106. This may be true since the defendant's home forum is likely to apply the
law of the state where the tort occurred. See generally Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). This may prove to be of little importance where the plaintiff is
effectively denied his day in court because maintaining suit in defendant's home
behind strict liability' 07 will be furthered when the power of a
state to assert jurisdiction and, hence, the power of a state to vin-
dicate the policies underlying strict liability are so severely cur-
tailed.
D. What Remains of the Fairness Test
The World-Wide Court failed to make any distinction between
the degree of contacts necessary in a case where economic loss
alone occurs and a case where bodily injury, disfigurement, or
even death occur.1 08 State sovereignty must be observed. How-
ever, even if a defendant has purposefully connected himselfl0 9 to
state would be prohibitively costly and logistically impractical. In addition, there
is the problem of one state interpreting the law of another. See Respondent's
Brief at 22, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
Aftarnase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965) (failure to grant juris-
diction may disadvantage plaintiff too severely such that no other adequate means
of redress may be possible); Cf. Bach v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 521
(D. Ariz. 1979) (failure to consider economic status of the plaintiff may effectively
deny him his right to trial).
107. By removing the elements of negligence from the analysis, it has become
easier for the plaintiff injured by dangerously defective products to recover. All
that need be shown is that the product is defective and that the injuries of the
plaintiff were caused or enhanced by the unknown defect. See Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). These also
are the thoughts embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1963-64).
108. This is the same over generalization made by Judge Sobeloff in Erlanger.
It is not clear why proper judicial analysis could not consider the nature of the
harm involved in deciding if fairness to both plaintiff and defendant would be
served by granting jurisdiction. Since a personal injury suit involving bodily harm
is of a different character than a suit involving only economic loss, and there is an
important public policy concern to provide adequate compensation from the
wrongdoer (as evidenced by the promulgation of strict liability in tort, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1963-64)), it seems the jurisdictional evaluation
should be adjusted to account for this. Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas Servs.
Corp., 442 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1971) (injury to body is of a different character than
injury to purse, therefore, the jurisdictional analysis should be adjusted accord-
ingly). See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 245-46 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300 (1970).
The respective authors assert that the requisite quantum of contacts should vary
proportionately with the benefits and inversely with the costs involved with the
exercise of jurisdictional power in a given case. Part of this consideration should
be an analysis of the nature of the harm involved. Cf. New York Times Co. v.
Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966) (bodily harm should be considered differently
from economic harm).
109. The Arizona Supreme Court, in Phillips, equates the purposeful activity as
required by Hanson with foreseeability of entry into the forum state. The Phillips
court believed that since negligence (or strict liability) by definition is not pur-
poseful, it would not be proper to apply a purposefully availing doctrine to defend-
ants in negligence cases. The court also noted the difficulties with semantics in
Hanson and attempted to avoid them by giving little significance to a literal appli-
cation of the doctrine. 100 Ariz. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735.
But see, Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Funda-
mental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300, 309 (1970). The holding in Phillips
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the forum state or has derived sufficient benefit, it is still possible,
although unlikely, that a suit may be dismissed as being unfair to
the defendant." 0
If the defendant has somehow availed himself of the privileges
and benefits of the forum state sufficient to satisfy the test laid
down by the Supreme Court, jurisdiction will usually be upheld,
regardless of state interest, inconvenience, or efficiency."' This
may mean that the fairness test is of no further import, with the
possible exception of hard cases. 112 The chance that a hard case
would survive seems slim. Any contacts sufficient to show a for-
eign defendant purposefully availed himself of state law such that
he would be amenable to suit, as required by the Court's literal
reading of Hanson, would not be a hard case.113 Jurisdiction
would be upheld without difficulty. The desirability of this judi-
cial rigidity is highly questionable."14
has been criticized as placing undue influence on the nexus between the act giving
rise to the litigation and the defendant's connection to the state.
110. This is what is apparently indicated by the lip service paid to the fairness
test as discussed in note 71 supra.
111. 444 U.S. at 294. The Court earlier stated that no matter how fair it may be
to litigate within the forum, the sovereignty of defendant's home state may act to
divest the forum state of jurisdiction unless minimum contacts exist. Thus, the
Court has essentially bisected what was once a single fairness test with respect to
due process. First, minimum contacts must be established, then fairness will be
analyzed. Therefore, if the defendant purposefully avails himself of the state
enough to satisfy the Court's view of the constitutional minimum, his inconve-
nience or the state's interest may no longer be important, since it is rendered un-
important by the establishment of contacts which satisfy the sovereignty issue.
112. A "hard case" such as Judge Sobeloff's example may be conceived of as
where the small California tire dealer intentionally and purposefully ships a
number of tires directly to Pennsylvania for use on the plaintiffs tour buses. The
shipment is pursuant to the plaintiff's order and the defendant has never solicited
business in Pennsylvania. Due to defects in the tires, the buses shake violently
and much business is lost. Since the plaintiff can better afford it and the records
establishing the damages are mobile, suit may be more efficient in California.
Since the fairness analysis of the Supreme Court would not consider the small
size of the defendant, he may be forced to defend in Pennsylvania. An effective
"fairness analysis" would likely prevent this.
113. At least it appears that a minimum contacts sovereignty test must first be
performed before a fairness analysis will take place. It is not clear why this bifur-
cation is desirable. See notes 61, 63 & 80 supra and accompanying text. See also
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illi-
nois, 1963 U. IL.. L.F. 533, 534.
114. As indicated in notes 108-111 supra and accompanying text, fairness can-
not be assured by rigid application of archaic principles. "The very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
V. THE RATIONALE OF THE MINORITY
A. Justice Brennan: Fairness to the Parties Over Fairness to the
State
In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan rejected the majority's ar-
gument as construing International Shoe too narrowly. Justice
Brennan also believed that the standards set forth by the early
cases were perhaps already obsolete. 115 Justice Brennan desired
to shift the analysis back to a more detailed consideration of state
interest and actual inconvenience to the defendant. He noted that
the focus of International Shoe was not on state sovereignty, but
on fairness and reasonableness." 6 A quantitative test was specifi-
cally avoided by the International Shoe Court in favor of analyz-
ing the qualities associated with a suit against a foreign
defendant. "The existence of contacts, so long as there are some,
was merely one way of giving content to the determination of fair-
ness and reasonableness," ' 1 7 rather than being the sole determi-
nant.
Justice Brennan placed great weight on a state's manifest inter-
est in providing an effective means of redress for its citizens or
others within its jurisdiction. He believed a state has a legitimate
concern in enforcing laws designed to insure safe travel on high-
ways maintained for travel by all citizens or visitors."18
Justice Brennan also asserted that very little actual inconve-
nience would be suffered by World-Wide or Seaway in defending
a suit in Oklahoma.1 9 Distance to the courtroom was seen as al-
most insignificant when dealing with defendants such as these. 2 0
115. 444 U.S. at 299.
116. Id. at 300.
117. Id. See notes 99 & 100 supra.
118. By reducing the degree of safety a motorist may expect on the forum
state's highways, a seller may reasonably be deemed to have sufficiently invaded
the forum state's sovereignty to establish contacts for jurisdictional purposes.
Thus, a state interest in the litigation should not be difficult to demonstrate. See
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32, (1949) (states have broad
power to protect inhabitants against perils to health and safety, even by use of
measures which bear adversely on interstate commerce); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
T.B. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966) (rational nexus between the fundamen-
tal events giving rise to the causes of action and the forum state must be shown,
giving the state sufficient interest in the litigation); Afternase v. Economy Baler
Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965) (a state has a manifest interest in providing ade-
quate means of redress for its citizens); B.K. Sweeney Co. v. Colorado Interstate
Gas Co., 429 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1967) (state has a manifest interest to provide redress
for a tortious episode that results from in-state contacts, however limited or tran-
sient those contacts may be).
119. 444 U.S. at 302.
120. Justice Brennan noted that modern technological advancements have
made travel to distant forums quite convenient. This is especially true when deal-
ing with large corporations such as World-Wide and Seaway; the cost of airfare
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Rather, "the constitutionally significant 'burden' to be analyzed
relates to the mobility of the defendant's defense. [It is unlikely
the defendants would suffer special hardship or have their de-
fense damaged by travel to a distant forum. If this were the case,
constitutional limits] would require consideration for defendant's
interests."'121 Justice Brennan found it difficult to see how due
process was truly offended if the defendant suffered no real in-
convenience.
Justice Brennan also noted that although Seaway and World-
Wide's defense was apparently mobile, plaintiff Robinson's case
did not share the same feature. The accident, which is the subject
of the litigation, occurred in Oklahoma. The injured plaintiffs
were hospitalized in Oklahoma at the time the suit was filed. Es-
sential witnesses and evidence, including the defective car, were
in Oklahoma. Travel to New York by the Robinsons in order to
settle their dispute would be far less than convenient and would
certainly not meet the fairness concept embodied in International
Shoe .122
The point most strongly argued by Justice Brennan was that of
the foreseeability of the products entry into the forum state.123
An automobile is intended to travel. Indeed, a car is marketed
with a large part of its appeal being the distance it may travel on
a single tankful of fuel. No real difference was noted between an
auto being placed into the stream of commerce by a distributor
and one driven into the interstate stream by a consumer.124 The
will be a most insignificant part of the cost of their defense. Also noted was the
defendant's preparedness to defend suits in foreign jurisdictions and the fact they
did carry insurance for such occurrences. Id. at 301 n.1, 304 n.7, and 305 n.9.
121. 444 U.S. at 301.
122. Without a fairness analysis that looks both to the defendant and the plain-
tiff, true due process cannot be served. The plaintiff has been diminished by inju-
ries suffered due to defendant's possible negligence. By denying jurisdiction,
plaintiff's right to recover compensation due him may effectively be denied. Leflar,
The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. PUB. L 282 (1960); cf
Hutson v. Fehr Bros. Inc., 584 F.2d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983
(1978) (tremendous expense of trying lawsuit in distant jurisdiction may force set-
tlement); Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 959 (1979) (distinction drawn between commercial and noncommercial
activity for purposes of state long arm statutes in terms of who may more easily
travel to a distant forum); Garrett v. Ruth Originals Corp., 456 F. Supp. 376, 383 n.8
(S.D. Ohio 1978) (a husband and wife do not have same financial ability as a cor-
poration to defend c- bring suit in a foreign forum).
123. 444 U.S. at 306. Justice Brennan places great importance on the personal
injury and tortious nature of the harm involved.
124. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (defendant who
entry of the Audi into Oklahoma was not misuse which might ne-
gate foreseeability, but was driven on an interstate highway as
might be reasonably expected by any realistic dealer or distribu-
tor.
Justice Brennan was easily able to conceive of collateral bene-
fits accruing to the defendants from their choice to enter a nation-
wide network of auto distributors. 125 Automobiles, such as the
Audi are generally purchased for their utility, This utility is not
only enhanced but actually produced by the endeavors of many
others in the auto business who provide service and maintenance
at repair centers throughout the nation126 Purchasers of Seaway
autos are able to rely on such out-of-state repair service, there-
fore, Seaway's sales are enhanced. Collateral benefit should not
have been difficult to find.
Any effort by World-Wide or Seaway to assert that they dealt
only within local areas was unrealistic and should have been dis-
counted.127 By engaging in the business of auto distribution,
World-Wide and Seaway should have expected suit anywhere an
auto might reasonably be driven.128 Justice Brennan noted that
petitioners not only could have, but actually did, purchase insur-
ance to protect themselves in cases such as these. 29
Justice Brennan's most valuable insights may be those regard-
ing the changing nature of the economy which may, in essence,
render earlier decisions obsolete. 30 A more modern approach
may be required. As explained by Justice Marshall in Shaffer v.
ships product into stream of commerce should defend it wherever it reasonably
ends up); Sunn Classic Pictures, Inc. v. Budco, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (exact commercial linkage to distant plaintiff need not be shown as long as
arrival was by normal channels of commerce). But see Granite States Volkswagen
v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972) (driving car across country is not
within normal channels of commerce sufficient to render defendant amenable to
suit in the forum state); Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425
P.2d 647 (1967) (mobility of auto is of no importance).
125. 444 U.S. at 307. Interstate highways span the nation; service stations are
found on nearly every corner; dealerships and repair centers abound. Therefore,
this economic structure makes it feasible and desirable to traverse far from the
actual state of purchase of the automobile.
126. National advertising endeavors with messages such as "see your Buick
dealer today" or promises of factory-backed warranty service at "any of your
friendly Chevrolet dealers" cannot help but enhance sales such that every dealer
derives benefit from the national program. Id.
127. Id. at 305.
128. Mann v. Frank Hrubetz & Co., Inc., 361 So. 2d 1021, 1024 (Ala. 1978) (mobil-
ity of product should apprise defendants of its entry into any forum); but see Upp-
gren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170 (D. Minn. 1969)
(general mobility is not enough to provide foreseeability; the defendant must fore-
see movement through the precise state in which the tort occurs).
129. 444 U.S. at 305 n.9. Certainly the cost of insurance is past on to the cus-
tomer as a cost of doing business.
130. Id. at 308. Although the majority noted the fundamental change in the
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Heitner; "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'
can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new proce-
dures." 13 1 The societal concept on which International Shoe was
based is no longer accurate. Commercial realities are such that
no distributor of goods can truly expect his product to remain in
the locale in which it is sold.132 Mobility of products is even de-
sired in order to compete in today's market. "Customers and
goods can be anywhere else in the country usually in a matter of
hours and always in a matter of a very few days."133 Any fair
minded businessman should have foreseen the Audi's entry into
Oklahoma.
Justice Brennan believed that the extreme concern for inconve-
nience to defendants was no longer required. To be truly fair, the
plaintiff's as well as the defendant's rights must be considered. 3 4
Merely requiring a defendant to travel to the place of trial could
not always be so onerous a burden to amount to a violation of due
process. Indeed, there was nothing violative of fairness or reason
in recognizing commercial reality and the obsolescence of the
older views.135
The belief that individuals must be held responsible for the
consequences of their wrongful acts is the foundation of Justice
Brennan's views. Defendants should not be able to hide behind
the sovereignty of their own state in order to effectively avoid
compensating those they may injure outside that state. To allow
this would frustrate the precepts of due process and substantial
American economy, they refused to adjust the minimum contacts test. See note 60
supra and accompanying text.
131. 433 U.S. at 212.
132. This is especially true of manufacturers, but modern law denies the dis-
tinction between manufacturers, dealers, or distributors. The trend is now to hold
all "sellers" in the commercial chain responsible for a product's presence in the
market and liable for any injuries caused by the product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402(a), Comment f (1963-64).
133. 444 U.S. at 309.
134. Professor Leflar notes:
Once it was realized that plaintiffs have as much justifiable interest in
having their claims adjudicated at convenient places as to defendants, it
became possible to begin to give real meaning to the generalization in
terms of what facts make it fair and substantially just to both parties for
their case to be tried in one state or another.
Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Power, 9 J. PUB. L. 282, 285
(1960).
135. 444 U.S. at 309-10.
justice as required by International Shoe 136 by denying in many
cases the opportunity to plaintiffs to effectively settle their griev-
ances with defendants. 37
In summary, Justice Brennan did not wish to do away with the
importance of state boundaries as limitations on the assertion of
jurisdiction. He desired a modern test using the contacts between
the parties, the forum, and the litigation to determine the most
reasonable place of trial.138
B. Justice Marshall. A Contemporary View of "Purposefully
Availing"
Justice Marshall was also concerned with the narrow view laid
down by the majority. 13 9 He did not believe that the Robinsons
had sought to justify the assertion of jurisdiction by Oklahoma on
one single tortious occurrence. Rather, Justice Marshall believed
the assertion of jurisdiction was premised "on the deliberate and
purposeful actions of the defendants themselves in choosing to
become part of a nationwide, indeed a global, network for market-
ing and servicing automobiles."' 40 The defendants' purposeful en-
deavors in the auto industry were executed with the intent of
taking advantage of the collateral economic benefit available by
engaging in the national scheme.' 4 1 In fact, Justice Marshall
surmised that "Seaway would be unlikely to sell many cars if au-
thorized service were available only in Massena, N.Y."142 By vol-
untarily choosing to become part of this national network, Seaway
and World-Wide did not attempt to minimize the possibility of ef-
fects in other states. Instead, they conducted themselves in such
a manner so as to increase the possibility of such effects, since it
was to their economic advantage to do s0.143 Justice Marshall as-
serted that good businessmen dealing in Audi automobiles should
certainly have foreseen the likelihood that a defect in an Audi
136. Id. at 311-12.
137. See note 108 supra.
138. 444 U.S. at 312. This would seem highly preferrable to the rigid application
of an obsolete 1945 concept.
139. Id. at 313. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Marshall in his dissent, as well
as filing his own dissent. Id. at 317. See note 148 infra.
140. 444 U.S. at 314.
141. See note 112 supra.
142. 444 U.S. at 314. Justice Marshall also noted that dealers derive a substan-
tial amount of income from servicing cars from distant forums. Although Seaway
may not hold itself out to service out-of-state cars from specific states, it does hold
itself out to all customers from any state in general. It is doubtful Seaway would
turn a customer away on the grounds he was a citizen from a certain state. It fol-
lows that individual dealers do benefit from being part of a nationally organized
and authorized repair system. See note 126 supra.
143. See notes 112 & 128 supra.
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might manifest itself in Oklahoma.144
Such an argument in favor of jurisdiction was not, as the major-
ity proposed, one of "foreseeability alone." Instead, it was the re-
sult of the defendants engaging in a national enterprise for
economic gain. Although some individuals could attempt to insu-
late themselves from suit in certain jurisdictions, this would not
always be possible. 45 Some activities, by their very nature, may
remove an individual's option of conducting oneself in such a way
so as to avoid violating public policy or subjecting oneself to the
jurisdiction of foreign states.146 Justice Marshall felt the auto in-
dustry was one such endeavor147 and that torts caused by danger-
ously designed autos should not provide protection to sellers
because they take place in forums unsolicited by the defend-
ant.148
144. As Justice Brennan noted, Seaway and World-Wide executives must have
been good businessmen since they had purchased insurance for out-of-state liabil-
ity. 444 U.S. at 305 n.9.
145. It would seem unfair to immunize from suit in Colorado, the seller of a
transcontinental aircraft that crashes in that state while en route from California
to New York because the seller did not affiliate himself with Colorado. Simply be-
cause the aircraft travels somewhat faster, it does not seem to be more foreseeable
that it may "enter" Colorado any more than an automobile travelling cross-coun-
try. See Bach v. McDonnell Douglas, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 521 (D. Ariz. 1979) (nature
of instrumentality involved may make precise foreseeability notions impossible);
Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1977) (one who
sells transient product must defend product in any reasonably foreseeable place).
But see Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170-71 (D.
Minn. 1969) (extensive mobility is insufficient to provide requisite probability of
destination).
146. This idea of considering the nature of the instrumentality and the perti-
nent public policies regarding inherently dangerous items is taken up by Justice
Blackmun, 444 U.S. at 318; see also note 148 infra.
147. 444 U.S. at 317.
148. Justice Blackmun in a separate dissent, id. at 318, asserted that the critical
factor in deciding whether to uphold jurisdiction is the nature of the instrumental-
ity involved. A pragmatic examination of the motor vehicle transportation system
shows that the United States is a nation on wheels. Interstate highways, wide va-
rieties of license plates, and "miles per gallon" all serve to show the population is
on the move, with the principle mover being the automobile. Because of this, Jus-
tice Blackmun believed any person in the business of providing vehicles should
anticipate the arrival of his product in a foreign state.
Since Oklahoma strives to provide safe roads, regulate travel, and police the
highways, travel is promoted in that state (the notion of collateral benefit was dis-
cussed earlier at notes 95 & 126 supra and accompanying text). These efforts serve
to enhance the business of those engaged in auto sales; therefore, amenability to
suit in such a foreign jurisdiction is in keeping with the notions of justice and fair
play as required. 444 U.S. at 319.
It appears that Justice Blackmun was more concerned with modern social policy
VI. THE IMPACT OF WORLD- WIDE AND THE
RESULTING UNFAIRNESS
As demonstrated, the early decisions had not clearly distin-
guished between the number of contacts required to assert juris-
diction when the subject of the litigation concerned the contacts
themselves and when the contacts provided the jurisdictional ba-
sis to adjudicate a more remote or economic action.149 Previously
it seemed that there was some sort of distinction. 5 0 In World-
Wide, the Court appeared to deny any distinction by indicating a
desire to return to the rigid rule of Hanson v. Denckla.151 For an
action based on either personal injury or economic loss, the de-
fendant must purposefully, intentionally, and directly connect
himself with the forum state. 5 2 This analysis denies an examina-
tion of the nature and quality of the defendant's business in gen-
eral to determine if fairness would permit assertion of jurisdiction
over him.15 3
It has been suggested that in tort situations, jurisdiction cannot
be based on the fact that the defendant actually committed a tort
within the state. To do so is to decide the act itself is tortious, the
very question the proceedings are to determine if jurisdiction is to
be found. 5 4 It would be better to avoid such a circular analysis
and examine the whole of the defendant's conduct in terms of
what he has undertaken to do and what effects his business may
likely cause. 55 Under this analysis, where persons are injured,
requisite contacts should be at a minimum. The fact that injury
has occurred should be enough. 5 6 When the harm is purely eco-
nomic, further contacts should be demonstrated.157 This distinc-
tion in requisite contacts would serve to promote the social policy
and its underlying effects than he was with the rigid application of timeworn
precedents.
149. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas Servs. Corp., 442 F.2d 1136, 1140
(9th Cir. 1977) (injury to body is of a different character than injury to purse); Car-
rington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66
MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967) (requisite contacts should be adjusted according to the
nature of the harm involved).
151. 444 U.S. at 294-96. This is the Hanson concept of sovereignty over fairness.
See note 82 supra.
152. 444 U.S. at 294-96.
153. See notes 110 and 121 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Cummins, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers
in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028, 1043 (1965).
155. See notes 146, 147, & 149 supra and accompanying text.
156. See generally Duignan v. A.H. Robins Co., 98 Idaho 134, 559 P.2d 750 (1977)
(suit allowed in Idaho for injuries caused by defective I.U.D. manufactured in Vir-
ginia and utilized in California).
157. See, e.g., Long v. Mishicot Modern Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 432 (1967).
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of compensating those injured by dangerous products under cir-
cumstances like those found in World-Wide .158
The majority's use of the assertion in Hanson of an "orderly ad-
ministration of the laws" is misplaced. 159 It was believed that this
essentially meant predictability of the law's application.160 It
would seem more proper to use the concept with reference to fair-
ness in settling disputes. Where a manufacturer and a national
importer have submitted to jurisdiction in Oklahoma, and a re-
gional distributor and dealer may only be sued in New York, how
has an orderly administration of the law been accomplished? 161
The fact that a suit had been commenced and proceeding in
Oklahoma, therefore, should have been one of the factors in de-
ciding the fairness of the Oklahoma assertion of jurisdiction over
the contesting parties.162
If the plaintiffs consolidate all defendants in New York, the
chance of a favorable outcome may be jeopardized since the
plaintiff's case may not be as mobile as the defendant's de-
fense. 63 To be unable to bring suit against all defendants in one
forum may cause the defendants who are before the court to do a
substantial amount of finger pointing at any absent defendants,
creating highly complicated issues for the trier of fact to decide.164
It is very difficult to see how this constitutes a fair and orderly ad-
ministration of the laws where plaintiffs are so severely disadvan-
taged without any corresponding disadvantage to defendants if
jurisdiction is upheld.
The majority decision tends to present an unrealistic picture of
society. In effect, the changing nature of economic realities was
denied with a reassertion of the importance of state bounda-
158. The social policy involved has been demonstrated by the advent of strict
products liability at the interest in compensating those injured by dangerous prod-
ucts without resorting to a complicated negligence analysis. See note 107 supra.
159. 357 U.S. at 250-51, (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
160. 444 U.S. at 297.
161. Respondent's Brief at 18, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980).
162. See Jenkinson v. Murrow Bros. Seed Co., 272 S.C. 148, 249 S.E.2d 780 (1978).
163. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. T.B. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1966)
(residents forced to follow nonresident defendants to their home state may so se-
verely disadvantage plaintiffs due to excessive costs and inconvenience such that
injustice is promoted); Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22
Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (injustice rather than justice may be promoted by
rigidly applying the traditional jurisdictional tests).
164. Id. Also, the efficiency in the resultant multiplicity of actions is highly sus-
pect.
ries.165 Fairness was denied under the rationale that crossing
state lines to assert jurisdiction over defendant would be too in-
convenient to the defendant without the purposeful connection of
the defendant to the forum state under Hanson. However, a pro-
ceeding held just across the state line may be far more conve-
nient to both parties than one in a distant corner of the
defendant's -own state.166 This logic underlies the 100 mile bulge
provision with respect to service of process contained in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 67
It is difficult to conceive why state sovereignty should prevent a
suit against a foreign defendant when his acts have injured one
within the forum state, where the forum state has a strong inter-
est in adjudicating the dispute, and the defendant's own state has
no reciprocal interest in preventing the litigation. 68 A case-by-
case analysis should be permitted, not merely to determine pur-
poseful and intentional contacts, but also to explore all issues rel-
evant to fairness. The Court's rigid rule of requiring a Hanson-
type analysis will preclude most cases from receiving this type of
analytical scrutiny.' 69
165. See note 61 supra.
166. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 534. Professor Currie contends that state bounda-
ries should serve as indicia of hardship rather than ad hoc determiners of jurisdic-
tion.
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). Realizing that state lines may prove to be highly artifi-
cial and burdensome, the Federal Rules allow jurisdiction to be extended any-
where in the Uhited States up to 100 miles from the place where the suit was
commenced. Thus, in certain circumstances, the jurisdiction of one state may ex-
tend across one or several other states to gain jurisdiction over the defendant.
168. See Schlesinger, Methods of Programs in Conflicts of Laws, Some Com-
ments on Ehrenzweigs Treatment of "Transient" Jurisdiction, 9 J. PUB. L. 313
(1960). Professor Schlesinger supports a national body of systematic law based on
an inverseforum non conveniens system.
Forum non conveniens allows the court to decline to exercise jurisdiction when-
ever it appears that the cause before it may be more appropriately tried else-
where. An inverse system would allow state courts to retain jurisdiction where a
case may more appropriately be tried in the plaintiffs state rather than the de-
fendant's home state. Considerations involved would include: (1) whether the
plaintiff has a right to the judicial machinery of the forum state; (2) whether the
state has a rational interest in the litigation; (3) the forum in which witnesses and
evidence are most available; (4) the forum which will be more familiar with the
applicable law; and (5) the relative inconvenience and hardships to the parties.
This same idea is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976), which provides "Iflor
the convenience of the parties and witnesses, . . . a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division ......
For a thorough examination of forum non conveniens, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
CivIL PROCEDURE, 663 (2d ed. 1977).
169. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS OF LAws § 37 (1969). The theme running through the Restatement is
one of fairness and reasonableness over sovereignty. State lines serve only to trig-
ger a fairness analysis rather than allow automatic jurisdiction. Conversely, these
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The World-Wide decision appears to place procedure above
substance. The fourteenth amendment guarantees no particular
form of procedure; only fairness in the administration of substan-
tive rights is protected.' 70 To place too much importance on
threshold matters, such as "doing business' 171 within state
boundaries, may never allow the wrongful acts of defendants to
come to light. In addition, the timeworn phrase "to every wrong
there is a remedy" may hold little meaning to plaintiffs who can-
not compete with corporate funding.172 In cases such as these,
substantive rights would not be protected; they would be denied.
It is true that the World-Wide decision will protect defendants
from the paralyzing consequences of a finding of requisite con-
tacts by means of a single tort committed within the forum state
as feared by Judge Sobeloff.173 But to applaud the decision for
this type of result seems to kill the patient in order to cure the
cancer. Also protected will be defendants who intentionally enter
into businesses that have far-reaching consequences and corre-
sponding far-reaching profits even though they do not know pre-
cisely where the consequences occur or from whence profits are
derived.174 Although foreseeability as part of the basis of assert-
ing jurisdiction is a complicated concept, it is neither the sole de-
terminant, nor is it beyond the capabilities of judicial analysis. 75
To remove foreseeability from the jurisdictional analysis, as the
World-Wide decision effectively has done, is to deny what a busi-
same state lines do not erect sovereign boundaries which can only be penetrated
by the most "maximum" of minimum contacts.
See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958). The author asserts
that fairness calls for an independent determination by the court upon the merits
of each case, and that courts should not be overly concerned with federalism. But
see Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal Sys-
tem, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1957). Judge Sobeloff insists state sovereignty should
be jealously protected.
170. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
171. See Ajax Realty Corp. v. J.F. Zook, Inc., 493 F.2d 818, 822 (4th Cir. 1972).
"[T]he day is long past when the 'minimal contact' necessary to satisfy due pro-
cess is to be equated with the traditional concept of doing business." Id. at 822.
See note 98 supra.
172. See notes 122 & 134 supra.
173. See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1956). Judge Sobeloff's illustration and concerns were discussed in notes 101 & 102
supra and accompanying text.
174. See note 145 supra.
175. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 284, 289, 291, 435, 440, 441, 442
(1963-64).
nessperson truly expects when he enters into a profitable en-
deavor.
The Court's decision changes the point of argument from
"should have reasonably foreseen" to "did actually foresee."
Even so, if the defendant did actually foresee interstate conse-
quences and did connect himself to the state, it may be found to
be unfair to require him to defend in the forum state. Since the
fairness analysis only enters the picture after sufficient state con-
tacts are established,176 it appears as though fairness will only act
to divest a state of jurisdiction and never to uphold jurisdiction
over the out-of-state defendant. Fairness that considers only the
possible wrongdoer and not the one wronged cannot be truly fair
at all.177
Although clarifying the required contacts necessary for jurisdic-
tion over a foreign defendant, it is apparent the majority pre-
ferred the simple method over the equitable one. The majority
evidently believed enough flexibility would be provided by apply-
ing the minimum contacts test of International Shoe without
resorting to more modern tests. If the minimum contacts test is a
threshold to be met prior to a fairness analysis, rather than a part
of the fairness analysis itself, then the flexibility sought is not real
but remains only an academic discussion. 78
Instead of revising the doctrine of minimum contacts to adopt
the modern commercial realities of the eighties and beyond, the
World-Wide Court not only halted the progress of enlightened de-
cisions, 179 but also reversed the positive trend of considering the
plaintiff's as well as the defendant's rights to due process and fair
administration of their respective substantive rights.180
176. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 134 supra. It appears as though the Court has traded fairness for
simplicity at the expense of the plaintiff's rights.
178. The Illinois Supreme Court observed:
Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may
have been reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to
reality, and injustice rather than justice is promoted . . . . [R] ules of law
which grow and develop within those principles must do so in light of the
facts of economic life as it is lived today. Otherwise . . . the principles
themselves become impaired.
Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 443, 176
N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
179. See, e.g., Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp 1205 (D.N.J. 1974);
Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Co., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966). These
cases represent instances where the respective courts recognized modern com-
mercial realities and that the plaintiff's right to fairness is equal to that of the de-
fendant. Jurisdiction was upheld to provide injured plaintiffs an appropriate
chance to recover for wrongs done to them.
180. See note 134 supra. A reasonable fear may be posed regarding a possible
flood of litigation as a result of the more convenient trip to the courthouse. It
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By allowing jurisdictional expansion, better social policies
would likely be served. This expansion, in tandem with strict
product liability,181 would serve to keep defective and ul-
trahazardous products off the market or at least promote remu-
neration to those injured by these dangerous products. A
balancing of interest would seem to place the burden of traveling
to a distant forum on the defendant-seller rather than on the in-
nocent purchaser. As Professor Woods feared,182 the Court chose
to adhere to a literal interpretation of the Hanson formulation.
Evidently the time has not yet arrived when the essence of Han-
son, McGee, and International Shoe can be synthesized into a
modern and useful analytical tool.
VII. CONCLUSION
By tracing the development and evolution of the jurisdictional
doctrine of minimum contacts, it has been shown that no distinc-
tion will be made between actions that are brought as a result of
personal injury and those that result from economic injury
alone.183 The rigid tests required by Hanson, as applied to eco-
nomic situations, will be applied to tort actions as well. State sov-
ereignty remains the ultimate consideration184 rather than a
consideration of fairness to all parties involved with respect to
due process requirements.
The World-Wide decision is not in keeping with modern eco-
nomic realities.185 This may prove to be especially important
when considering the recent rash of cases concerning the en-
hancement of bodily injury from accidents involving the new com-
pact automobiles. 86 The jurisdictional rule established by the
would still seem that a court could weigh the possibility of harassment by the
plaintiff as part of the fairness analysis in determining jurisdiction. Also, assess-
ing costs and like measures in such cases should serve to curb any such vexatious
litigation.
181. See note 107 supra. If all matters are equal and a burden must be borne,
why not by the seller. He is in business to derive profit from the sale of his prod-
uct, hence he should be required to defend them. Wronged plaintiffs, however, are
not in the business of being injured; therefore, those injured should be provided
the greatest ability to recover within the bounds of fairness and due process.
182. Woods, supra note 8, at 912-13.
183. See notes 52 & 54 supra.
184. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
186. The recent Pinto cases against the Ford Motor Co. for enhancement of in-
jury due to defectively designed fuel tanks may be seen as an example of this.
World- Wide decision seems especially troublesome when the pro-
cedural concern for a state's sovereignty interferes with, or over-
rides, the policies of substantive law such as that found in the
area of products liability.' 87 The Supreme Court has apparently
chosen to replace the analysis that examines fairness to the par-
ties with one that examines fairness to the state under the guise
of protecting a defendant's right to due process.
Where plaintiffs would suffer substantial hardship when juris-
diction is denied and defendants would suffer no real inconve-
nience if it were granted, it appears as though an analysis that
requires denial has rendered the pursuit of "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" meaningless.188
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187. See note 107 supra.
188. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
